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THE STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF EQUILIBRIA
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Abstract
In this paper the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicri-
teria games is analysed. It turns out that the classical result for the set of
equilibria for bimatrix games, that it is a nite union of polytopes, is only
valid for multicriteria games if one of the players only has two pure strate-
gies. A full polyhedral description of these polytopes can be derived when
the player with an arbitrary number of pure strategies has one criterion.
JEL Code: C61, C72
11. Introduction
Multicriteria strategic form games were rst introduced by Blackwell (1956). The
dierence between these games and ordinary strategic form games is that a player
in a strategic form game only has one criterion (his payo) to evaluate the outcome
of the game (i.e. the prole of strategies chosen by the players of the game) while in
a multicriteria game each player may have an arbitrary number of criteria (payos)
that are intrinsically uncomparable with each other.
Nash introduced the notion of an equilibrium for non-cooperative games in strategic
form in his papers in 1950 and 1951. Since then the equilibrium concept has been
and still is being studied extensively. One of the topics in this investigation is the
structure of the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game. (A bimatrix game is a non-
cooperative game in strategic form with two players.) Over the last decades a fair
number of papers has been published on this topic. It turned out that the set of
equilibria of a bimatrix game is a nite union of polytopes. Proofs of this fact can
for example be found in Winkels (1979), Jansen (1981) and Jansen and Jurg (1990).
From a computational point of view these results are quite important. The main
reason for this is that the original proof of Nash of the existence of equilibria is
not constructive. It shows that the assumption that a non-cooperative game does
not have an equilibrium leads to a contradiction. It does therefore not tell you
how to nd an equilibrium for a given game. Also the basic inequalities in the
denition of the equilibrium concept are not of much help. In general (without
further assumptions on the structure of the game) these inequalities are polynomial
and it is not clear how one can actually calculate one single solution given these
inequalities, let alone how to nd a parametric representation of the complete set of
2equilibria.
In the case of bimatrix games life is much simpler. For such a game it is possible to
show that the set of equilibriais a niteunion of polytopes and itis moreoverpossible
to derive a polyhedral description of each of these polytopes. Hence, by using some
theory of linear inequalities, it is possible to compute all extremal points of such
a polytope and in this way nd a parametric description of the set of equilibria.
There are also a number of exact algorithms for the computation of one specic
equilibrium, such as the algorithm of Lemke and Howson (1964), that are based on
the special structure of the set of equilibria for bimatrix games.
In this paper we investigate to what extent the results on the structure of the
set of equilibria of a bimatrix game can be carried over to the equilibrium concept
introduced by Shapley (1959) for two person multicriteria games. Unfortunately our
results are on the negative side of the spectrum. First of all we provide an example
to show that the set of equilibria may have a quadratic component whenever both
players have three or more pure strategies and one of the players has more than
one criterion. Secondly we show that the set of equilibria is indeed a nite union
of polytopes if one of the players has two pure strategies. The actual polyhedral
description of these polytopes cannot be computed directly though, unless the player
with an arbitrary number of pure strategies has exactly one criterion.
Notation For a nite set F, the number of elements of F is denoted by jFj and
(F) denotes the set of probability vectors on F. For an element x 2 (F),
the carrier of x is the set fi 2 F j xi > 0g. The element ei of (F) denotes
the probability vector that puts all weight on i 2 F. For two vectors x;y 2 IR n
hx;yi :=
Pn
i=1 xi  yi is the inner product of x and y,a n di fx i<y iholds for all
3i =1 ;:::;nwe say that y dominates x. We write x  y if xi  yi for all i =1 ;:::;n.
2. Preliminaries
In a (two-person multicriteria) game the rst player has a nite set M of pure
strategies and player two has a nite set N of pure strategies. The players are
supposed to choose their strategies simultaneously. Given their choices m 2 M and
n 2 N, player one has a nite set S of criteria to evaluate the pure strategy pair
(m;n). For each criterion s 2 S the evaluation is a real number (As)mn 2 IR. Of
course we also have an evaluation (Bt)mn 2 IR for each criterion t 2 T of player two.
Thus the game is specied by the two sequences
A := (As)s2S and B := (Bt)t2T
of M  N-matrices
As := [(As)mn](m;n)2MN and Bt := [(Bt)mn](m;n)2MN:
Despite the fact that the players may have more than one criterion, we will refer to A
and B as payo matrices. The game is denoted by (A;B). The players of the game
are also allowed to use mixed strategies. Given such mixed strategies p 2 (M)
and q 2 (N) for players one and two resp, the vectors
pAq := (pAsq)s2S and pBq := (pBtq)t2T
are called payo vectors (for players one and two, resp.).
BEST REPLIES AND EQUILIBRIA
In the context of bimatrix games (games in which each of the two players has exactly
one criterion) the equilibriumconcept of Nash is one of the best known ways to solve
4these games. A very convenient way to dene equilibria, certainly when one wants
to analyze their structure, is by means of best replies.
An analogous approach can be used in the case of multicriteria games. Shapley
(1959) rst introduced the notion of equilibriumfor this typeof games. His denition
is a direct generalization of the equilibrium concept for strategic form games with
only one criterion. In order to describe this denition we need to generalize the
notion of a best reply.
Denition 1. Let q 2 (N) be a strategy of player two. A strategy p 2 (M)
of player one is called a best reply of player one against q if there is no other strategy
p0 2 (M) such that the payo vector p0Aq dominates the payo vector pAq.T h e
set of best replies of player one against q is denoted by BR1(q).
It almost goes without saying that we also can dene best replies against a strategy
p and the set BR2(p) for player two. Now the denition of equilibrium runs as
follows.
Denition 2. A strategy pair (p;q) is called an equilibrium if p is a best reply
of player one against q and q is a best reply of player two against p.
Remark It is also possible to dene a more restrictivenotion of equilibrium based
on the dominance relation on IRn dened by "x dominates y if xi  yi for all i,a n d
at least one of these inequalities is strict". Since this relation does not necessarily
yield a closed set of equilibria (see e.g. Borm, Tijs, and van den Aarssen (1988)), we
decided to use the weaker version. Nevertheless, proofs similar to the ones presented
in this paper show that also in this case we can nd a decomposition of the set of
equilibria into a number of relative interiors of polytopes.
53. Stability regions and structure
In case of bimatrix games, the proof that the set of equilibria is a nite union of
polytopes is based on the fact that this set of equilibria can be chopped up in a
nite number of sets. Then each of these sets can easily be shown to be a polytope.
It turns out to be worthwhile to execute this procedure for multicriteria games as
well.
SHAPLEY'S RESULT
First of all we need the result of Shapley (1959). Essentially Shapley (1959) provides
a link between best replies and linear programs. In order to describe this link we
need to introduce some terminology.
Recall that for each criterion t 2 T the real number eiBtej is the payo of player
two according to his criterion t and Bt is the matrix whose entry on place i;j is
this number eiBtej. Now suppose that player two decides to assign a weight t  0
to each criterion t 2 T available to him (we assume that
P
t2T t equals one). The
vector  =(  t) t 2 T is called a weight vector. According to the criterion associated
with this weight vector the evaluation of the outcome (ei;e j)i st h er e a ln u m b e r
X
t 2 T












to calculate his payo. With this terminology, the result of Shapley (1959) can be
rephrased as follows.
6Lemma 1. Let p be a strategy of player one and let q be a strategy of player two.
Then the following two statements are equivalent.
(i) q is a best reply of player two against p
(ii) there exists a weight vector  := (t)t2T such that q is a best reply of player two
against p according to the criterion associated with B().
In words, the Lemma states that q is a best reply of player two against p if and only
if player two can assign to each criterion t 2 T a non-negative weight t such that
the resulting weighted criterion is maximal in q, given that player one plays p.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF EQUILIBRIA
In this section we will construct a decomposition of the set of equilibria of the game
(A;B) into a nite number of sets that are easier to handle. This decomposition is
in fact the multicriteria equivalent of the technique that is used to prove that the
set of equilibria of a bimatrix game is a nite union of polytopes. In order to give
the reader some background concerning the line of reasoning employed here, we will
rst give an informal discussion of this technique.
Suppose that we have a bimatrix game and a subset I of the set of pure strategies
of player one. Then we can associate two areas with this set, one in the set of mixed
strategies of player one and one in the set of mixed strategies of player two. For
player one, this is the set (I) of mixed strategies that put all weight exclusively on
the pure strategies in I, and for player two this is the set U(I) of mixed strategies
of player two against which (at least) all strategies in (I) are best replies. (Such
as e tU ( I ) is called a stability region.) Obviously we can do the same for a subset
J of the set of pure strategies of player two.
Now the crucial point is that (for a bimatrix game) all these sets (I), (J), U(I),
7and U(J) are polytopes (and for each of these polytopes it is even possible to nd
a describing system of linear inequalities). So, also the set
((I)\ U(J))  ((J)\ U(I))
is a polytope. Moreover there is only a nite number of such sets and it can be
shown that their union equals the set of equilibria of the given bimatrix game.
Although the sets U(I)a n dU ( J ) not necessarily need to be polytopes in the mul-
ticriteria case, we can still carry out this procedure for two person multicriteria
games.
To this end, let v be an element of IRn and let P be a polytope in IRn. The vector
v is said to attain its maximum over P in the point x 2 P if
hv;xih v;yi for all y 2 P:
Then we have the following well-known Lemma.
Lemma 2. Let v be a vector in IR n. Further, let P be a polytope in IR n and let
F be a face of P.I fvattains its maximum over P in some relative interior point x
of F, then it also attains its maximum over P in any other point of F.
Now let I be a subset of M. Slightly abusing notation we write (I)f o rt h es e t
of strategies p 2 (M) whose carrier is a subset of I. Further, the stability region
U(I) (of player two) is dened as
U(I): =f q2(N) j (I)  BR1(q)g:
Similarly we can dene sets (J)a n dU ( J ) for a subset J of N.
8Theorem 1. The set of equilibria of the game (A;B) equals the union over all
I  M and J  N of the sets
((I)\ U(J))  ((J)\ U(I)):
Proof. (a) Assume that a strategy pair (p;q)i sa ne l e m e n to fas e t(  ( I )\
U ( J ))  ((J) \ U(I)) for some subset I of M and subset J of N. We will only
show that p is a best reply against q.
Since q is an element of U(I), we know that any strategy in (I)i sab e s tr e p l y
against q. However, p is an element of (I) by assumption. Hence, p is a best
reply against q.
(b) Conversely, let (p;q) be an equilibrium. Take I = C(p)a n dJ=C ( q  ). We
will show that p is an element of (I)\ U(J).
Obviously p is an element of (I). So we only need to show that p is also an
element of U(J). In other words, we need to show that each strategy q 2 (J)i sa
best reply against p. To this end, take a q 2 (J). Since q is a best reply against
p we know by Lemma 1 that there exists a weight vector  =(  t) t 2 T such that q
is a best reply against p according to the criterion associated with B(). In other
words, the vector pB() attains its maximum over (N)i nq . However, since q
is an element of the relative interior of (J), pB() must also attain its maximum
in q by Lemma 2. Hence, q is a best reply against p according to B(), and, again
by Lemma 1, q is a best reply against p. /
Clearly the sets (I)a n d ( J) are polytopes for all subsets I of M and J of N.S o ,
from the previous Theorem it follows that the set of equilibria of the game (A;B)
is a nite union of polytopes as soon as the sets U(I)a n dU ( J ) are polytopes.
Unfortunately this need not be the case. In the next section we will provide a
9counterexample.
4. An Example
We will give a fairly elaborate analysis of the counterexample. This is done because
the calculations involved in the determination of best replies and stability regions
for this game are exemplary for such calculations in general.
There are two players in the game. Both players have three pure strategies. The
pure strategies of player one are called T;M; and B, the pure strategies of player
two are called L;C; and R. Further, player one has two criteria and player two has
only one criterion. The payo for player two according to his criterion is always












Player one is the row player and player two is the column player. The rst digit in
an entry gives the evaluation by player one of the occurence of that particular entry
according to his rst criterion. The second digit gives the evaluation according to
his second criterion.
Since player two is completely indierent it is immediately clear that a strategy pair
(p;q) is an equilibrium if and only if p is an element of BR1(q). In other words,
the set of equilibria equals the graph of the best reply correspondence BR1.I no r d e r
to calculate this graph we will rst compute the areas in the strategy space of the
second player where the best reply correspondence BR1 is constant. In other words,
we need to compute the stability regions of player two.
First of all note that if player two plays strategy q =( q L ;q C;q R) and player one
plays his pure strategy eT, the payo for player one is eTAq =( q L ;q L). This is a
10point on the line x = y w h e np l o t t e di nt h exy-plane. Similarly, eMAq =( 4 q C;0)
is a point on the line y =0a n de BAq =( 0 ;4 q R) is a point on the line x =0 .N o w






















































































































In situation I both eMAq and eBAq are dominated by eTAq.I ns i t u a t i o nII eTAq
dominates eBAq, but does not dominate eMAq.( S i t u a t i o n III is the symmetric
situation with the roles of the second and third pure strategy of player one inter-
changed.) In situation IV eTAq is itself undominated and dominates neither eMAq
nor eBAq,a n dVdepicts the situation in which eTAq is dominated by some convex
combination of eMAq and eBAq.
Now if we calculate exactly where in the strategy space of player two these ve
11situations occur we get the picture below. The boldface Roman numbers in the
various areas in this picture correspond to the Roman numbers assigned to the
situations depicted above. Notice that an area in the strategy space of player two
corresponding to one of the ve situations above is necessarily of full dimension by
the graphics above. Further, one cannot jump from situation V to situations I, II
or III without crossing the area where situation IV occurs (except on the boundary













The boundary line between areas I and II and areas III, IV and V is given by the
equality qL =4 q R. Similarly, qL =4 q Cis the boundary between areas I and III and
areas II, IV and V.
Finally, it can be seen in the graphics above that the boundary between area V
and the others is exactly the set of strategies where eTAq is an element of the line
segment between eMAq and eBAq. This means that it is the set of strategies for
12which (qL;q L) satises the linear equation qRx+qCy =4 q Cq R. Hence it must be the
set of strategies that satisfy the quadratic equation
qLqR + qLqC =4 q Cq R
(except the solution (qL;q C;q R)=( 1 ;0 ;0) of this equation). This gives us enough
information to write down the stability regions of player two.
U(fTg)=I [ II[III[IV
U(fMg)= II [IV [ V




U ( f T;M;Bg)= IV \ V
Note the essential dierences with the structure of stability regions for bimatrix
games. For a bimatrix game we would for example have the equality
U(fM;Bg)=U( f Mg )\U( f B g ) :
The example shows that this is no longer true for multicriteria games. In this case
the set
U(fMg) \ U(fBg)=IV [ V
subdivides into the areas IV, on whose relative interior
(fT;Mg)[(fT;Bg)
13is the set of best replies, and V, on whose relative interior the set of best replies is
indeed (fT;M;Bg). An area like IV simply cannot occur for bimatrix games.
The second essential dierence, and the main one in this section, is the fact that
U(fT;M;Bg) is a quadratic curve. This means that the subset
(fT;M;Bg)U(fT;M;Bg)
of the set of equilibria cannot be written as a nite union of polytopes. This con-
cludes the example.
5. Multicriteria games of size 2 n
The previous example shows that, in case at least one of the players has more than
one criterion, the set of equilibria may have a quadratic component as soon as both
players have at least three pure stategies. So, in the multicriteria case it is necessary
to have (at least) one player who has exactly two pure strategies to guarantee that
the set of equilibria is indeed a nite union of polytopes. So assume w.l.o.g. that
player one's set of pure strategies M equals fT;Bg. In this section we will show that
this assumption is also sucient, i.e., under this assumption the set of equilibria is
indeed a nite union of polytopes. A complication though is that we only have a
polyhedral description of those polytopes when player two has only one criterion.
STABILITY REGIONS OF PLAYER TWO
In this special case the analysis of the dominance relation on the possible payo
vectors for player one for a xed strategy q of player two is quite straightforward.
Since player one has only two pure strategies eT and eB, the set of possible payo
vectors is a line segment (or a singleton in case eTAq = eBAq)i nI R S. Given this
observation it is easy to check
14Lemma 3. The following two statements are equivalent.
(i) eTAq is dominated by pAq for some p 2 (M)
(ii) eTAq is dominated by eBAq.
Given this lemma we can show that each stability region of player two is a nite
union of polytopes. Two cases are considered.
Case 1. For jIj = 1. Assume for the moment that I = fTg.T h e n
U ( I )=f q 2 (N) j (fTg)  BR1(q)g
= fq 2 (N) j eT 2 BR1(q)g
= fq 2 (N) j eTAq is not dominated by pAq for any p 2 (M)g




fq 2 (N) j eTAsq  eBAsqg
where the fourth equality follows from the previous Lemma. Clearly this last ex-
pression is a nite union of polytopes. By the same line of reasoning we get that
U(fBg) is a nite union of polytopes.
Case 2. For I = fT;Bg.U s i n gL e m m a3i ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h a tU ( I )i st h es e t
of strategies q for which eTAq does not dominate eBAq and eBAq does not dominate
eTAq.S o ,U ( I )=U( f Tg ) \ U( f B g ). Thus, since both U(fTg)a n dU( f Bg ) are nite
unions of polytopes as we saw in Case 1, U(I) is also a nite union of polytopes.
STABILITY REGIONS OF PLAYER ONE
Now that we have come this far, the only thing left to prove is that the stability
region
U(J)=f p2(M) j (J)  BR2(p)g
15is a nite union of polytopes for each set J  N of pure strategies of player two. In
order to do this we need to do some preliminary work.
Let the subset V (J)o f ( M )IR T be dened by
V (J): = f ( p;) j (J) is included in the set of best replies against p
according to the criterion B()g
= f(p;) j (J) is included in the set of strategies where
the vector pB() attains its maximum over (N)g:
Note that we allow pB() to attain its maximum in points outside (J) as well. We
only require that (J) is indeed a subset of the set of points where pB() attains
its maximum over (N).
Further, let the projection :I R 2IR T ! IR 2 be dened by
(p;v): =p for all (p;v) 2 IR 2  IR T :
Now we can prove
Lemma 4. The stability region U(J) equals the projection (V (J)) of the set
V (J).
Proof. (a) Let p be an element of U(J). We will show that p is also an element
of  (V (J)).
Let q be an element of the relative interior of (J). Since p is an element of U(J)
we know that q is a best reply to p. Then we know, by Lemma 1, that there is
a weight vector  =(  t) t 2 T such that the vector pB() attains its maximum over
(N)i nq  .S o ,s i n c eq is a relative interior point of (J), pB() also attains its
16maximum over (N) in any other point of (J) by Lemma 2. Therefore (p;)i s
an element of V (J)a n dp= ( p;)i sa ne l e m e n to f( V( J )).
(b) Conversely, let p = (p;)b ea ne l e m e n to f( V( J )) and let q be an element of
(J). Then we know that the vector pB() attains its maximum over (N)i nq .
Again by Lemma 1, this means that q is a best reply against p. Hence, since q was
chosen arbitrarily in (J), p is an element of U(J). /
Now it is straightforward to show
Theorem 2. For a multicriteria game of size 2n the stability region U(J) is a
nite union of polytopes.
Proof. Observe that the set V (J) is the collection of points (p;) 2 IR 2  IR T that
satisfy the system of polynomial (in)equalities
pi  0 i =1 ;2
p 1+p 2 =1






 t pBtej 
X
t2T
tpBtek for all j 2 J and k 2 N:
Therefore, V (J) is a semi-algebraic set. Furthermore, by the previous Lemma, U(J)
is the set of vectors p 2 IR 2 such that there exists a  2 IR T for which
(p;) 2 V (J):
Hence, by the Theorem of Tarski and Seidenberg (see e.g. Blume and Zame (1994)
for a clear discussion of this Theorem) U(J) is also a semi-algebraic set. Further,
17U(J) is compact, since V (J) is compact and  is continuous. So, U(J) is the union
of a nite collection fSg2A of sets S in (M)a n de a c hS is described by a nite
number of polynomial inequalities
p;k(x)  0( k =1 ;:::;m()):
However, (M) is a line segment in IR2.S ot h es e to fp o i n t si n ( M ) that satises
one particular inequality is the nite union of (closed) line segments (singletons also
count as line segments). So, since each S is the intersection of such nite unions,
S is itself the nite union of closed line segments. Therefore, since U(J)i st h e
nite union over all sets S, it is the nite union of closed line segments. Hence,
U(J) is a nite union of polytopes. /
THE CASE jTj =1
In this case we have a complete polyhedral description of the polytopes involved in
the union. Notice that we already know that the sets (I)a n d ( J) are polytopes,
and the sets U(I)a n dU ( J ) are nite unions of polytopes. We will now show that
a polyhedral description of all these polytopes can be found.
For the polytopes (I), (J) this polyhedral description is trivial. For U(I)w e
saw in Case 1 below Lemma 3 that it is the nite union of polytopes of the form
fq 2 (N) j eTAsq  eBAsqg:
So, in Case 1 the polytopes involved in the union are already given by linear in-
equalities. This implies that also in Case 2 we can nd the linear inequalities that
describe the polytopes involved. Finally, for J  N,w eg e t
U ( J )=f p 2 (M) j (J)  BR2(p)g
= fp 2 (M) j pBej  pBek for all j 2 J and k 2 Ng:
18The assumption that jTj = 1 is used in the second equality. The last expression in
the display now shows that U(J) is itself a polytope that can be written as the solu-
tion set of a nite number of linear inequalities. This concludes the argumentation.
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